COMMENTS
The Alaska Statehood Act Does Not Guarantee Alaska
Ninety Percent of the Revenue from Mineral Leases on
Federal Lands in Alaska
Ivan L. Ascott"

I. INTRODUCTION

Alaska is the largest state in the Union.1 At over 365 million
acres, it is one-fifth as large as the contiguous forty-eight states.2
Alaska also has a proportionately large share of federal land within its
borders.3 The U.S. government owns 220.8 million acres in Alaska,
which is over sixty percent of the land in the state.4
It is significant for Alaska that such a large amount of the state's
land is under federal control because Alaska's economy depends on
natural resource use. In particular, oil fuels the state's economic
engine and contributes about eighty percent of the tax revenues for
state government.' Alaskan oil is also important to the rest of the
country because it accounts for about fifteen percent of domestic
production.6 The most likely, and perhaps last, site for development
of a major new oilfield in Alaska is in the coastal plain of the Arctic
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5. STATE OF ALASKA DEP'T OF REVENUE TAX DIV., FALL 2003 REVENUE SOURCES
BOOK 2 [hereinafter REVENUE SOURCES].
6. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 573 tbl. 881.
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National Wildlife Refuge ("ANWR").7 Development in ANWR has
been the subject of numerous recent congressional initiatives, which
seek either to end the moratorium on exploration 8 or to extend the
moratorium indefinitely.9
If ANWR is developed, and the development happens under the
same terms that are currently applied to other public lands in Alaska,
the State of Alaska will receive ninety percent of the proceeds that the
leases and royalties generate.' ° Under this distribution formula,
codified in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 ("MLA"), the federal
government retains ten percent of the revenues for administrative
purposes." This arrangement has been in place since before Alaska12
achieved statehood in 1959 and is unique among the states.
However, a recurring provision in the bills to allow exploration in
ANWR has been a call to change the MLA revenue distribution, as
applied to ANWR, to a fifty-fifty revenue split between the federal
government and the State of Alaska.' 3
Whether Congress has the authority to unilaterally alter the
ninety-ten revenue distribution formula currently applied to public
Congress' authority to
lands in Alaska has not been established.'
change the MLA might at first appear to be an obvious exercise of its

7. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE OIL AND GAS
POTENTIAL OF THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 1002 AREA, ALASKA, (U.S.G.S.
Open File Report 98-34) (1999). The survey states:
Summary and Table EA4. The most recent government study of oil and natural gas
prospects in ANWR, completed in 1998 by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
found that there is an excellent chance (95%) that at least 11.6 billion barrels of oil are
present on federal lands in the 1002 area. There also is a small chance (5%) that 31.5
billion barrels or more are present. USGS estimates that there is and excellent chance
(95%) that 4.3 billion barrels or more are technically recoverable (costs not
considered); and there is a small chance (5%) that 11.8 billion barrels or more are
technically recoverable.
Id., quoted in M. LYNNE CORN ET AL., ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: LEGISLATIVE
ISSUES 4 (Cong. Research Serv., Issue Brief for Cong. No. IB10094) (Oct. 22, 2002) [hereinafter
ANWR LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2002].
8. H.R. 39, 108th Cong. (2003) (to end moratorium and open ANWR to exploration),
noted in M. LYNNE CORN ET AL., ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR):
CONTROVERSIES FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS (Cong. Research Serv., Issue Brief for Cong. No.
IB101 11) (Aug. 19, 2003) [hereinafter ANWR CONTROVERSIES 2003].
9. H.R. 770, 108th Cong. (2003), and S. 543, 108th Cong. (2003) (to designate area as
wilderness), discussed in ANWR CONTROVERSIES 2003, supranote 8.
10. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (2003).
11. Id.
12. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 693 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998).
13. H.R. 6,108th Cong. (2003), noted in ANWR CONTROVERSIES 2003, supra note 8.
14. PAMELA BALDWIN, LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO PROPOSED DRILLING FOR OIL
AND GAS IN THE ARCTIC NAT'L WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR) 30 (Cong. Research Serv., Issue
Brief for Cong. No. RL31115) (Apr. 22, 2003).
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legislative power, but that authority is clouded."5
The Alaska
Statehood Act ("the Act"),16 which created the State of Alaska,
incorporates the MLA through section 28(b) of the Act, which states:
Section 35 of the [Mineral Leasing] Act entitled "An Act to
promote the mining of coal, phosphate, oil, oil shale, gas, and
sodium on the public domain"...

is hereby amended by

inserting immediately before the colon preceding the first
proviso thereof the following: ", and of those from Alaska 52 1/2
per centum thereof shall be paid to17 the State of Alaska for
disposition by the legislature thereof.,
In the context of the full MLA, this amendment effectively gave
the State of Alaska ninety percent of the lease and royalty revenues
from mineral development on federal lands in the state.18
Alaska has argued that Congress purposefully incorporated the
MLA into the Statehood Act through section 28(b), and in doing so,
permanently granted the state ninety percent of the revenues from
mineral development on federal lands.19 Alaska asserts that the Alaska
Statehood Act is a "compact" between the people of Alaska and the
United States.2"
As such, the Act is akin to a contract and
congressional legislation cannot unilaterally alter it.2t Consequently,
15. Id.at31.
16. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48 U.S.C.
ch.2, refs & annos. (2003).
17. Alaska Statehood Act § 28(b).
18. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 693-94. See infra section III.C for a full explanation of Alaska's
ninety percent share.
19. See, e.g., 1995 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) 355, 1995 WL 867851 [hereinafter 1995
Alaska Op. 355]; 1988 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) 327, 1988 WL 249552 [hereinafter 1988
Alaska Op. 327]; 1987 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) 121, 1987 WL 121051 [hereinafter 1987
Alaska Op. 121]; 1986 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) 363, 1986 WL 81089 [hereinafter 1986
Alaska Op. 363]; 1981 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen., File No. J-66-556-81, 1981 WL 33504
[hereinafter 1981 Alaska Op.]; Videotape: Alaska vs. The United States of America: The
Statehood Compact Case (Office of the Governor, State of Alaska 1994) [hereinafter Compact
Case]; Videotape: Broken Promises: Alaska's Defense of its Statehood Compact (Metcalfe, Mac.,
Dye, Kathy; State of Alaska 1994) [hereinafter Broken Promises]; Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. 685;
Appellant's Reply Brief, Alaska v. United States, 119 F.3d 16 (Table, Text in WESTLAW),
Unpublished Disposition, 1997 WL 33559182 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-5124) [hereinafter
Appellant's Reply Brief]; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Alaska v. United States 118 S. Ct.
1035, 1997 WL 33549527 (1997) (No. 97-750) [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari];
BALDWIN, supra note 14, at 30-32.
20. See, e.g., 1995 Alaska Op. 355, supra note 19; 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19;
1986 Alaska Op. 363, supra note 19; 1981 Alaska Op., supra note 19; Compact Case, supra note
19; Broken Promises, supra note 19; Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. 685; Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note
19; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., 1995 Alaska Op. 355, supra note 19; 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19;
1986 Alaska Op. 363, supTa note 19; 1981 Alaska Op., supra note 19; Compact Case, supra note
19; Broken Promises, supra note 19; Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. 685; Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note
19; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19.
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from Alaska's perspective, the passage of any legislation that alters the
existing revenue-sharing formula in the MLA is invalid without
Alaska's consent.22 This includes ANWR drilling proposals that
would alter the MLA to Alaska's detriment.23
This Comment argues that Alaska's position is legally incorrect.
The text of the Act simply does not support the position that minerallease and royalty proceeds from federal lands are part of Alaska's
"compact." In addition, the legislative history of the Act does not
support Alaska's position, nor does case law that has addressed related
issues. Following this Introduction, Part II of this Comment expands
on Alaska's position and explains Alaska's "Statehood Compact"
argument. Part III reviews the historical background of the Alaska
Statehood Act as it pertains to the ninety percent-ten percent revenuesharing formula under the MLA. Part IV discusses Alaska v. United
States,24 a case that addressed closely related issues and likely will
figure prominently in any future argument concerning Alaska's rights
under the Act. Part V, after analyzing the text and legislative history
of the Act and judicial treatment of statehood agreements generally,
concludes the Comment by arguing that Alaska's position will not
have success with the courts.
II. ALASKA'S STATEHOOD COMPACT ARGUMENT
Any discussion of Alaska's rights under its Statehood Act is ripe
for disagreement and novel arguments partly because the U.S.
Constitution has no mechanism that guides how new states will be
admitted into the Union.25 Consequently, after the original thirteen
states joined the Union, all of the remainder entered under different
circumstances and on unique terms. 26 Although parallels can be
drawn between their respective admissions, the condition of each new
state's entry into the United States contained elements unique to the
22. See, e.g., 1995 Alaska Op. 355, supra note 19; 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19;
1986 Alaska Op. 363, supra note 19; 1981 Alaska Op., supra note 19; Compact Case, supra note
19; Broken Promises, supra note 19; Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. 685; Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note
19; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19.
23. 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19; 1986 Alaska Op. 363, supranote 19.
24. 35 Fed. Cl. 685 (1996).
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("New states may be admitted by the Congress into this
union; but no new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor
any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent
of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress."); id. cl. 2 ("The Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state.").
26. See generally DANA LEE THOMAS, THE STORY OF AMERICAN STATEHOOD (1961).
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political circumstances of the nation at that time. Therefore, the
framework for resolving conflicts between the states and the federal
government over the effect of statehood acts necessarily draws on
historical sources and sometimes on unconventional ideas.
Alaska's position, for instance, distinguishes between "ordinary
legislation," amendable at the will of Congress, and "compacts,"
which Alaska says are binding on both parties in the same way that a
contract would be. 27 Alaska has argued that courts should interpret
compacts as they would contracts-by considering the intent of both
parties-rather than looking only at Congress's intent, as for routine
legislation.28 Presumably, if the Alaska Statehood Act was created by
two equal parties negotiating something like a contract, Alaska can
better argue a claim based on the expectations and understanding of
Alaskans at the time of statehood.
It also brings contractual and equitable issues, such as reliance,
into the discussion. For example, Alaska has argued that when Alaska
voters accepted its statehood package, acceptance was partly due to
their reliance on certain promises of members of Congress and
others.29
To maintain its position, Alaska must establish three basic
propositions: First, it must show that a "compact" has a legal status
giving the state more rights than does ordinary federal legislation.
Second, it must show either that the Alaska Statehood Act is such a
compact, or alternatively, that section 28(b) is an element of a compact
contained within the Act. Third, if it can establish the first two
propositions, it must show that the compact contains a promise to pay
Alaska ninety percent of the MLA proceeds in perpetuity.
A. Alaska Is Correct: A "Compact" ProvidesRights Beyond
Those of OrdinaryLegislation
The word "compact" is used in the Alaska Statehood Act, but it
is not defined.3" Therefore, one must look to other sources to
determine the meaning and legal status of the term. Black's Law
Dictionary defines a "compact" as, "An agreement or covenant
between two or more parties, esp[ecially] between governments or
27. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 698-99; Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 7; Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at 14.
28. See generally Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 19.
29. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 695; Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 9-10; Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at 7-8.
30. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48
U.S.C.A. ch.2, refs & annos (2003).
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states."3 1 The term "compact" appears in article I, section 10 of the
U.S. Constitution: "No state shall, without the Consent of
Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
state ....32 The Framers apparently understood that a compact
indicated some kind of an agreement between parties.
Case law also indicates that a compact is subject to different rules
than ordinary legislation and is equally binding upon both parties.
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrate this concept.33 First, Beecher
v. Wetherby sets out the deference that the Court has sometimes given
such compacts:
The convention which subsequently assembled accepted the
propositions, and ratified them by an article in the Constitution,
embodying therein the provisions required by the act of
Congress as a condition of the grants. With that Constitution
the State was admitted into the Union in May, 1848. It was,
therefore, an unalterable condition of the admission, obligatory
upon the United States, that section sixteen (16) in every
township of the public lands in the State, which had not been
sold or otherwise disposed of, should be granted to the State for
the use of schools. It matters not whether the words of the
compact be considered as merely promissory on the part of the
United States, and constituting only a pledge of a grant in
future, or as operating to transfer the title to the State upon her
acceptance of the propositions as soon as the
34 sections could be
afterwards identified by the public surveys.
Second, in an earlier case, Cooper v. Roberts, the Court upheld a
land grant after the federal government refused to allow the State of
Michigan to choose lands under the terms of its statehood agreement
when those lands were discovered to be rich in minerals. 3' The Court
in that case also described the applicable section of the statehood act as
condition"36 and as "obligatory upon the United
an "unalterable
37
States. ,
Some members of Congress who debated statehood for Alaska
shared the view that statehood acts rise above ordinary legislation.
Arguing against statehood, Senator Butler of Maryland said:
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (7th ed. 1999).
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, ci. 3.

33. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1877); Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. 173 (1855); see
also Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244-45 (1900).
34. Beecher, 95 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added), cited in 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19;
Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 7.
35. Cooper, 59 U.S. at 178, cited in Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 7.
36. Cooper, 59 U.S. at 178.
37. Id.
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A bill which grants statehood is not some minor piece of
legislation, but is a major function of the national legislature.
We cannot undertake to perform that function without
reminding ourselves that we are asked to make a grant which
cannot be revoked. We cannot, therefore, consider these bills as
we would ordinary legislation in the sense that ordinary
legislation may be 3amended or changed in subsequent years as
experience dictates. 8
Finally, the court that most recently looked at this issue
recognized that through a statehood compact Congress has the
authority to bind itself, in perpetuity, to a particular legislative
scheme. 39 Therefore, Congress could have made a compact with
Alaska, promising ninety percent of the mineral revenues from public
lands. In the end, though, this is not the issue on which Alaska's
argument will be won or lost.
B. Alaska Is Not Correct: The EntireAlaska Statehood Act Is Not a
Compact, Nor Is Section 28(b) of the Act Part of a Compact
The Alaska Statehood Act is sometimes loosely referred to as the
"Alaska Statehood Compact," as if the entire Act is necessarily a
compact.4" However, it does not follow that the two are synonymous.
Specifically, the proposition is incorrect because the text of the Act
does not support the idea that the entire Statehood Act is a compact.4"
While the Alaska Statehood Act does contain the word "compact," its
use is limited to a particular section of the Act.42 The limited use of
the word "compact" in the Act does not extend to section 28(b) and
the MLA.
Consequently, this Comment argues that Alaska's
reasoning fails on this element.
Analysis of the Act's text will make this position clear, and the
text is better understood in light of the Act's history. Therefore, this
issue will be revisited in section V.A, following discussion of the Act's
history in Part III and discussion of the case Alaska v. United States in
Part IV. Alaska v. United States is important to this discussion
because it shows that Alaska's argument also fails to meet its third
burden: In addition to the fact that section 28(b) is not part of Alaska's
38. 85 CONG. REc. 12316-17 (1958), cited in 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19.
39. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 699, 703 (1996).
40. See generally Compact Case, supra note 19; Broken Promises, supra note 19; 1995
Alaska Op. 355, supra note 19, at 1-3; 1981 Alaska Op., supra note 19, at 1; Reply Brief for
Petitioner 6, Alaska v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1035, 1998 WL 34103198 (1997) (No. 97-750).
41. See infra section V.A.
42. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48
U.S.C.A. ch.2, Refs & Annos (2003).
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''compact,'' that section neither contains nor implies the promises that
Alaska has claimed it does.
C. Although Congress Incorporatedthe MLA into the Alaska Statehood
Act to ProvideAlaska with a Source of Revenue, in Doing So It Did Not
PromiseAlaska That It Would Always Receive MLA Proceeds
Historical evidence shows that Congress included the MLA in
the Act, through section 28(b), to provide Alaska with a source of
revenue. For example, a Senate Report said:
Some of the additional costs connected with statehood will be
met by granting the State a reasonable return from Federal
exploitation of resources within the new State. In the past the
United States has controlled the lion[']s share of such resources
and, in some instances, retained the lion's share of the proceeds.
This situation, though it has not proved conducive to
development of the Alaskan economy, may have been proper at
times when the United States paid a large part of the expense of
governing the Territory. However, the committee deems it only
fair that when the State relieves the United States of most of its
expense burden, the State should receive a realistic portion of the
proceeds from resources within its borders.43
Alaska has cited to further evidence that it claims shows that it
received MLA proceeds in perpetuity as part of its statehood grant.44
Moreover, a number of Alaskans who were involved in the statehood
movement clearly believe that 90% of the MLA proceeds were part of
Alaska's grant.4"
For example, Ernest Gruening, who used his position as
appointed Governor of Alaska from 1939 until 1953 to support the
statehood movement and who was one of Alaska's first U.S. Senators,
thought that the MLA proceeds were part of Alaska's statehood grant.
Writing some ten years after statehood was achieved, he said of
Alaska's statehood package:
Most helpful was the provision that ninety percent of the
royalties and net profits from oil, gas and mineral leases on the
public domain would go to Alaska. This unique benefit not
enjoyed by the Western States was granted in part in
compensation for the fact that Alaska was not-as they wereunder the Reclamation Act. Alaska owes this provision to the
efforts of the late Senator Frank Barrett, of Wyoming, who
43. 1988 Alaska Op., supra note 19, at 327, citing S. REP. No. 85-1163 (1957).
44. See infra section V.B.
45. See Compact Case, supra note 19; Broken Promises, supra note 19.

2004]

The Alaska StatehoodAct

1007

insisted that this larger royalty should go to Alaska and that it
become part of our Statehood Act.46
Much of Alaska's evidence, however, is more ambiguous than it
might at first appear and consequently, when scrutinized closely, does
not support Alaska's position as strongly as it has argued. This issue
will be analyzed further in section V.B of this Comment.
Moreover, Alaska's claim that it should always get 90% of the
MLA proceeds was dealt a serious blow in Alaska v. United States,
which decided a closely related issue: whether Alaska was entitled to
ninety percent of the gross proceeds from mineral leases on public
lands within the state (it was not). By extension, Alaska v. United
States seems to stand for the proposition that even if section 28(b) was
part of Alaska's compact, that section does not contain47 a promise to
grant ninety percent of the MLA proceeds in perpetuity.
Alaska v. United States is better understood in light of the history
behind Alaska statehood and the MLA. An examination of the
history will also help to answer the question of whether section 28(b),
and consequently the MLA, is part of a compact between Alaska and
the federal government.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ALASKA STATEHOOD AS IT RELATES
TO THIS ISSUE

A. The Creationof the State of Alaska
The United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867.48 It
then proceeded to largely ignore its possession, only fitfully building
the civil infrastructure familiar to the states. 49 Despite its apathy
towards Alaska, Congress did take progressive steps towards building
civil institutions, such as in 1906 when Alaska was allowed a
nonvoting delegate to Congress and in 1912 when Alaska was allowed
an elected legislature.5" However, for the most part the federal

46. ERNEST GRUENING, THE BATTLE FOR ALASKA STATEHOOD 95 (1967).

47. See infra section IV.C.
48. CLAUS-M. NASKE, A HISTORY OF ALASKA STATEHOOD 29 (Univ. Press of America
1985) (1973).
49. See generally ERNEST GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA (1954) (cited in NASKE,
supra note 48, at 69). Prior to statehood, Alaska's first Senator, Ernest Gruening, wrote THE
STATE OF ALASKA. In the table of contents, he labeled the periods from 1867 to 1884 as "The
Era of Total Neglect," 1884 to 1898 as "The Era of Flagrant Neglect," 1898 to 1912 as "The Era
of Mild but Unenlightened Interest," and 1912 to 1933 as "The Era of Indifference and
Unconcern." Id. at 1.
50. NASKE, supra note 48, at 6.
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government's pre-statehood role in Alaska failed to adequately address
the political and economic aspirations of the territory's people."1
For example, pre-statehood, Alaskans suffered from a lack of
fully representative political rights at home and in Congress.5 2 While
Congress provided for an elected legislature for the territory, it gave it
limited authority. 3 The Territorial Legislature was not permitted to
regulate fish and game resources, nor was it allowed to establish state
courts that would interfere with the federal courts' authority. 4 The
Territorial Legislature's decisions were subject to the approval of
Congress and a governor who was appointed by the President. This
meant that the Legislature had limited taxing and spending authority,
making the territory dependant on the federal government for major
governmental services, such as a court system. 6 Often, the services
provided by the federal government proved inadequate and the limited
authority of the Territorial 5Legislature
made it difficult for it to
7
institutions.
those
supplement
Significantly, Alaskans had most of the burdens of U.S.
citizenship, but not its benefits. For example, Alaskans were subject
to the draft," and they had to pay federal income taxes; 59 however,
they could not vote in national elections, 60 they were not included in
many federal spending programs, 61 and they had only one nonvoting
representative in the House of Representatives.62
Many of the political and economic problems that Alaska faced
were the result of the territory being treated as a colony.6 3 As such,
Alaska's resources were exploited without the contrQls of fully
representative government enjoyed by the states. 64 Chief among the
motives of Alaskans pushing for statehood was their desire to address
federal laws that discriminated against the territory, often in favor of

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 19.
See Id. at 15-23.
Id. at 36-37.

54.

Id.

55. Id. at 6-7.
56. GRUENING, supra note 49, at 335-54 (discussing the failure of the justice system in
territorial Alaska).
57. NASKE, supra note 48, at 36-37.
58. See Ernest Gruening's keynote address to the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Let
Us End American Colonialism, reprinted in ERNEST GRUENING, supra note 46, at 74-91.
59. GRUENING, supra note 46, at 77; see also NASKE, supra note 48, at 246.
60. NASKE, supranote 48, at 70.
61. Id. at 76, 99-100.
62. Id. at 22.
63. Id. at 69-70; see also GRUENING, supra note 46, at 74-91.
64. NASKE, supranote 48, at 93, 99-102.
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Outside interests.6 5 In particular, the infamous Jones Act created a
monopoly for Seattle shipping companies that served Alaska, keeping
prices for imports and exports artificially high.66 The Jones Act
required that materials shipped to and from Alaska ports could only
be sent on American ships.67 Even though it was often more direct
and economical to ship through Canadian ports, Alaskans were
required to pay higher prices to ship through Seattle.6"
The Jones Act represented one expression of the problem that
Alaska was in the control of absentee interests.69 Alaska's fish, fur,
timber, and mineral resources were exploited for the benefit of faraway corporations, whose interest in the territory did not extend
beyond the profit motive.7" Alaskans complained bitterly that they
had little control over their resources and, in particular, they saw
mismanaged fisheries leading to a precipitous decline in that
resource.71 These Outside interests were overbearing to the local
populations in terms of economic and political grasp.72 As a result,
only the incidental benefits of the wealth of Alaska was going to the
people that lived there. 3
Another problem that Alaskans hoped to remedy through
statehood was the problem of constrictive federal land ownership.74
Prior to statehood, 99.8 percent of the land in Alaska was owned by
the federal government, while only 0.2 percent (500,000 acres) was
privately held.7" This concentration of federal land ownership was an
impediment to economic and community growth because of federal
laws that restricted development and settlement.7 6 The federal
government also made significant withdrawals of federal land for such
purposes as military reservations and national forests.77
The
reservations restricted that land to those specific purposes and made it
further unavailable to support economic development.78 By 1954 the
65. Id. at 99-101.
66. See 46 App. U.S.C. § 883 (2003) (the U.S. Maritime Act is commonly referred to by the
name of its sponsor, Washington Senator Wesley Jones), discussed in NASKE, supra note 48, at
100.
67. NASKE, supra note 48, at 100.
68. Id. at 100-01.
69. GRUENING, supra note 49, at 467; NASKE, supra note 48, at 121.
70. NASKE, supra note 48, at 19, 45.
71. GRUENING, supra note 49, at 245-68.
72. NASKE, supra note 48, at 121-30.
73. GRUENING, supra note 49, at 467; NASKE, supra note 48, at 121-30.
74. GRUENING, supra note 49, at 323-34.
75. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at 158.
76. GRUENING, supra note 49, at 323-27.
77. Id. at 327-32.
78. Id. at 323-34.
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withdrawals totaled 95 million acres7 9 (approximately equal to the size
of the state of Montana),8" and encompassed much of the most
valuable and productive land in the territory. 81
Although there had been attempts to address these problems
through statehood in the first half of the century, none of them was
successful.8 2 It took the Japanese invasion of Alaska in World War II
to bring Alaska to the close attention of the federal government and
begin the final journey to statehood. 3 Starting in 1946, every
Congress until 1958 introduced an Alaska Statehood bill. 4 Although
Alaskans and others aggressively supported statehood, disagreement
about the effects of making Alaska a state slowed its admittance.85
The expansive and remote geography, the small population, and a
perceived political immaturity of the populous were all argued as
reasons to bar Alaska statehood.86 There were also concerns about
giving such a small population representation in the Senate and the
possible effect on the balance of power in Congress, particularly the
effect on civil rights legislation.87
One of the major concerns about Alaska statehood was whether a
State of Alaska would have the financial means to support itself.88
Some opponents of statehood feared that Alaska would become a ward
of the federal government because it did not have the economic base
necessary for self-sufficiency.8 9 On the other hand, supporters of
79. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 691 (1996).
80. GRUENING, supra note 49, at 331-32.
81. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 692-93; see also GRUENING, supra note 49, at 323-34.
82. See generally NASKE, supra note 48.
83. NASKE, supra note 48, at 78-82. For a fascinating history of the Aleutian campaign, see
BRIAN GARFIELD, THE THOUSAND MILE WAR: WORLD WAR II IN ALASKA AND THE
ALEUTIANS (1969).
84. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 687.
85. NASKE, supra note 48, at 235-52.
86. Id.; see also Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 689-90.
87. NASKE, supra note 48, at 257-59. Southern Democrats feared that adding two Senators
from Alaska would upset their ability to block civil rights legislation. Id. This issue became less
significant in 1957, when Congress passed the first piece of civil rights legislation since
Reconstruction. Id.
88. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 689.
89. Id. at 688 n.2, which contains the following illustrative remarks:
Opponents argue that ...the expense of statehood is too great for Alaska to bear,
since the sources of revenue for Alaska as a State are so uncertain; that Federal
reservations would deprive the State of revenue from, and jurisdiction over, vast
areas...." STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TERRITORIAL AND INSULAR
POSSESSIONS OF PUBLIC LANDS COMM., 80TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON H.R.
206, A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADMISSION OF ALASKA, THE FORTY-NINTH
STATE 8 (1947); "The economic conditions in Alaska are unstable ...the resources of
the Territory are not sufficiently developed to allow private enterprise to take up the
slack in employment and provide necessary revenues should Federal spending be
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statehood argued that Alaska would be able to carry the burden of
statehood and prosper."
At the same time, those supporters
recognized that the state would need a strong economic foundation
and urged Congress to provide the future state with the means to
secure financial independence."
Although its "statehood package"
changed over the years, the primary means to ensure financial
independence for the new state was a grant of some portion of the
federal land to Alaska.9 2 However, there were also provisions in the
Act to provide Alaska with additional sources of revenue.93
B. Land Grants Were the Primary Component of
Alaska's Statehood Package
The issue of providing Alaska with the means to economic
independence is at the heart of Alaska's argument that Congress acted
intentionally when it referenced the MLA in the Statehood Act.
Alaska's argument is that the MLA was incorporated into the
Statehood Act as a "grant" to provide the future state with an
additional means of financial support, and as a set-off for the fact that
much of the most productive land in the state had already been
reserved by the federal government and was thus unavailable for
selection by Alaska. 94 In contrast, the federal government's counterabruptly curtailed." S. REP. No. 85-1163, at 11 (1958); "I am deeply concerned about
the very thin economy of Alaska .... Unless a more solid economic foundation is
built under it, Alaska will not be able to carry on successfully its duties and
obligations and to assume the full responsibilities of a State." 104 CONG. REC.
12,442 (1958) (statement of Sen. Monroney); "I do not believe the people of Alaska
are able to sustain the financial burden involved," 104 CONG. REC. 12,442 (1958)
(statement of Sen. Johnston).
Id. (citations reformatted).
90. 104 CONG. REC. 12,012 (1958).
Alaska is a going concern. As a matter of fact, Alaska is currently financing, by means
of its own revenues, all functions and services it is permitted to carry on. The
Territorial government has no debt, and actually has a cash surplus. The additional
activities Alaska would engage in after statehood is granted can normally be expected
to be financed through the additional revenues which would also become available to
Alaska as a State.
Id. (1958) (statement of Sen. Jackson, cited in Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 688).
91. See generally Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. 685.
92. Id. at 690.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 691-92. The following remarks by Senator Butler of Maryland reflect this
position:
Much of the best land and most valuable resources of the Territory have been
reserved or withdrawn from use by private industries or corporations. There are so
many land reserves and withdrawals that there has never been any complete, accurate
tabulation of them all. One tabulation, which may be reasonably complete, shows a
total of 98,500,000 acres in withdrawals out of the 365,481,600 acres in Alaska. This
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argument is that the land grants were the primary source of financial
independence for the new state. It says that the reference to the MLA
in the Act was a simple administrative function to provide a seamless
transition to statehood, but without providing the State any more
rights than the Territory already had.9"
Prior to statehood, a major concern of statehood proponents and
opponents alike was that the large amount of Alaskan land under
federal control made it impossible for Alaska to become a selfsufficient state. 96 A Senate report accompanying an earlier (failed)
statehood bill summed up the problem:
The expenses of the State of Alaska will be comparatively high,
partially due to the vast land areas within the State; but the State
would be able to realize revenues from only 2 percent of this vast
were made to modify the present
area unless some provisions
97
land ownership conditions.
In all of the statehood bills that appeared before Congress, there
were provisions for providing the state with grants of some portion of
the federal land. 98 The final version adopted included 103,350,000
acres for selection by the state over twenty-five years, including: a
direct grant of 102,550,000 acres of vacant, unappropriated, and
unreserved federal land; 400,000 acres of land located within national
forests for community development and expansion purposes; and, an
additional 400,000 acres to be used for community and recreation
areas. 99 Although the land grants were sizable,' ° some argued that
land grants alone were insufficient to support financial independence
because much of the most productive, and therefore most valuable,
land had already been withdrawn from Alaska's consideration by the
The State of Alaska has argued that this is one
federal government.'

area is about the size of the State of California and represents about 27 percent of
Alaska's total area. More important, it comprises almost all of the best and most valuable
resources known to exist in the Territory.
S. REP. No. 81-1929, at 34-35 (1950) (emphasis in original), cited in Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 69192.
95. Id. at 699; see also Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19.
96. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 688.
97. S. REP. NO. 85-1163, at 2 (1957), cited in Alaska, 35 Fed. CI. at 690 n.5.
98. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 690-91.
99. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48
U.S.C.A. Ch.2, Refs & Annos (2003).
100. Of the states created from the public domain, Alaska ranks seventh in percentage of
its area granted at about 27.9 percent, but has the largest total acreage of any state. The land
granted constituted a discontinuous area about the size of California. NASKE & SLOTNICK,
supra note 1, at 157.
101. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 691.
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of the reasons that the federal government promised Alaskans ninety
percent of the mineral revenues from their public lands." 2
C. Alaska Was Already Receiving Ninety Percent of the Mineral Leasing
Act Revenues Priorto Statehood
In its current form, the MLA provides that all eligible states,
except Alaska, receive a direct payment of fifty percent of the revenue
generated from mineral exploitation on federal lands within their
boundaries. 0 3 The federal government receives ten percent of the
revenue and the other forty percent goes to a reclamation fund
established under the Reclamation Act of 1902.104 The Reclamation
Act money is then redistributed to those states as public works
projects."' Alaska, exceptionally, receives a direct payment of ninety
percent of the revenue generated on federal lands
in the state, because
0 6
Act.
Reclamation
the
under
included
not
it is
This arrangement was created to address an inequity with the
MLA distribution that existed before statehood. 7 Prior to 1957, the
Territory of Alaska and the states received 37.5 percent of the
revenues under the MLA directly.0 8 For the states, the other 52.5
percent was placed in the reclamation fund." 9 For Alaska, though, the
other 52.5 percent that came from its federal lands was directed to the
federal treasury without any benefit going back to Alaska." 0
Alaska's unequal treatment under the MLA was addressed in
1957, when Alaska's nonvoting delegate to Congress, Bob Bartlett,
proposed to amend the MLA to give Alaska the entire ninety percent
revenue distribution from mineral leases."'
Instead, Assistant
Secretary of Interior Chilton and Senator Barrett of Wyoming
recommended that an amendment to the MLA be added to the
statehood legislation then under consideration, rather than as an
independent bill." 2 That amendment was added as section 28(b) of
the statehood bill." 3 However, the statehood bill failed to pass that
102. 1988 Alaska Op., supra note 19, at 2.
103. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (2003).
104. The Reclamation Act of 1902 is codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. (2003).
There is a historical note in 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2003).
105. Id. at § 391.

106. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (2003).
107. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 693 (1996).
108. Id. at 693.
109. Id. at 692.

110. Id.
111. Id., citing H.R. 3477, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957).
112. Alaska, 35 Fed. CI. at 692-93, citing H.R. REP. NO. 85-156 at 2-3 (1957).
113. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 692-93.
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year." 4 Rather than wait until the next attempt to pass a statehood bill
to address the MLA distribution, the proposal to change the
distribution was passed as a separate amendment to the MLA.11 '
The next year, 1958, a statehood bill finally passed both
houses." 6 It included the same section 28(b) as was in the previous
bill, but its effect was different than it would have been had the
Statehood Act passed the year before. Because the Territory had
already begun receiving ninety percent of the revenues, section 28(b)
changed the MLA again by replacing its reference to "the Territory of
Alaska" with "the State of Alaska.... 7 As a practical matter, the
immediate effect of section 28(b) was to apply the MLA and its ninety
percent distribution to the State of Alaska on the same terms that it
had applied to the Territory of Alaska."'
D. Statehood Was by Agreement Between Alaskans and
the United States
In July 1958, President Eisenhower signed the Alaska Statehood
Act. 19 The passage of the Statehood Act did not make Alaska a state,
however. It required the agreement of Alaskans to be effective.
Section 8(b) of the Act required Alaskans to approve statehood by
assenting to the following three propositions:
(1) Shall Alaska immediately be admitted into the Union as a
State?
(2) The boundaries of the State of Alaska shall be as prescribed
in the Act ...and all claims of this State to any areas of land or
sea outside the boundaries so prescribed are hereby irrevocably
relinquished to the United States.
(3) All provisions of the Act ...reserving rights or powers to
the United States, as well as those prescribing the terms or
conditions of the grants of lands or other property therein made
to the State of Alaska, are consented to fully by said State and its
people.12

114.
115.
116.
117.
U.S.C.A.
118.
119.
120.

Id.at 693.
Id.
Id.
Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 28, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48
Ch.2, Refs & Annos (2003).
Alaska, 35 Fed. CI. at 693-94.
NASKE, supra note 48, at 271.
Alaska Statehood Act § 8.
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Although passage of the Act was probably a forgone conclusion
because of its broad support, 121 the vote plays a key role in the
Alaska's position that the creation of the State of Alaska was a binding
agreement between two parties rather than one-sided legislation
amendable at the will of Congress.
On August 26, 1958, Alaskans went to the polls and by
majorities of more than 5 to 1, answered yes to all three of the
statehood questions. 122 On January 3, 1959, President Eisenhower
signed the proclamation making Alaska a state. 123 Alaska has since
argued that its citizens were urged to accept statehood based on
promises made by representatives of the federal government, and that
they relied on those promises in accepting statehood as a party to the
"statehood compact. ' 124 For example, prior to the vote, Secretary of
the Interior Fred Seaton traveled to Alaska and gave speeches in
support of statehood. 121 In a speech in Anchorage, Seaton stated,
"[T]he Act reaffirms Alaska's preferential treatment in receiving
[ninety percent] of all revenues from oil, gas, and coal leasing on the
public domain."' 126 Similarly, in a speech in Fairbanks, he said, "Since
early this year the territory has received [ninety percent] of all oil lease
revenues; the State of Alaska will continue to do so. '"127
These
statements have been portrayed by Alaska as a pledge on the part of
the federal government to share with Alaska, in128 perpetuity, ninety
percent of the revenue from federal mineral lands.
E. Oil Development on Alaska's North Slope
The most significant event to follow statehood in Alaska was the
discovery of oil on state land near Prudhoe Bay in 1968.129 It was not
the first discovery of oil in Alaska, but it was by far the largest. 30 It
was also well timed. Anxiety about rising oil prices in the 1970s
overcame environmental concerns about drilling and about building
121. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. In 1946, Alaskans passed a referendum
that endorsed statehood. NASKE, supra note 48, at 103. In 1956, Alaskans voted to accept a state
constitution that they had created the year before with the hope that it would help propel Alaska
to statehood. Id. at 228. Both of these measures were approved without consideration for or
expectation of ninety percent of the MLA proceeds.
122. NASKE, supranote 48, at 271-72.
123. Id. at 272.
124. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 699-700 (1996).
125. Id.at 695.
126. Id.at 696.
127. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19.
128. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 699-700.
129. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at 241.
130. Id. at 241-51.
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the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and gave an incentive to settle Alaskan
Natives' land claims.' In the first ten years of statehood, the State of
Alaska had received less than $100 million from lease sales; in
contrast, in 1969, in just one series of leases for state land around
Prudhoe Bay it received over $900 million. 32 Through 2000, the
North Slope of Alaska had produced 12.9 billion barrels of oil. 33
From 1978 to 2003, oil production in Alaska had brought the state
more than $50 billion in lease and royalty revenue.' 34
Prior to statehood, opponents had complained that by being
allowed to choose its lands over twenty-five years, Alaska had the
luxury of waiting to see which lands proved to be most valuable and to
choose among them. 3 ' To a certain extent, this concern proved to be
accurate because Alaska selected potential oil lands on the North
Slope, which have so far been the most valuable lands in the state. It
should be noted, though, that the state chose from the only lands on
the North Slope that had not been reserved from selection by the
federal government prior to statehood. Much of the land on the North
Slope had already been withdrawn from Alaska's consideration for
national defense uses and for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
("ANWR").'36 Moreover, Alaska chose the lands on the North Slope,
in part, because doing so was the easiest way to settle a problem over
coastal boundaries with the federal government, not just because of
their oil potential.'37
Prior to selection in early 1964, then Governor Egan did not see a
need to select North Slope lands as part of Alaska's land grant
because, under the MLA, Alaska was already receiving ninety percent
of the revenues from leases on the federal land there. 3 Therefore it
did not seem necessary to use Alaska's grant to choose those lands.'39
Although development did not begin in earnest until the late
1960s, after Alaska had selected potential oil lands as part of its grant,
oil had been found on the North Slope by non-native explorers as
early as the 1880s.141 In 1923, President Harding created the Naval
131. Id. at 224-74.
132. Id. at 250.
133. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, FUTURE OIL
PRODUCTION FOR THE ALASKA NORTH SLOPE 7 (2001).

134. REVENUE SOURCES, supra note 5, App. F.
135. NASKE, supra note 48, at 265.
136. See infra notes 140-152 and accompanying text.
137.

JACK RODERICK, CRUDE DREAMS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF OIL & POLITICS IN

ALASKA 167-169 (1997).
138. Id. at 152.
139. Id.; see also Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 696.
140. NASKE&SLOTNICK,supra note 1, at 241.
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Petroleum Reserve No. 4 in an area west of Prudhoe Bay and north of
the Brooks Range.14 ' It is now known as the National Petroleum
Reserve-Alaska ("NPR-A") and it encompasses 37,000 square
miles. 14 2 As a national defense withdrawal, these lands were
specifically excluded from selection as part of Alaska's statehood grant
under section 10 of the Act.'
Section 10 also provided that
"exclusive jurisdiction over all special national defense withdrawals
established under this section is hereby reserved to the United States,
which shall have sole legislative, judicial and executive power within
such withdrawals ....144
Under the 1980 legislation to open NPR-A to development, the
revenues from the petroleum reserve are split fifty-fifty between the
federal government and the State of Alaska.14 The reason that there is
a different formula for revenue distribution for NPR-A than for other
federal lands in Alaska is that the MLA specifically excludes "lands
within the naval petroleum and oil-shale reserves" from its scope;
therefore the ninety percent-ten percent split does not apply to
development there. 146 Although this separate revenue-sharing scheme
does not implicate the same statehood issues as development on other
public lands in Alaska, it did set a precedent for establishing another
revenue-sharing regime, albeit a political precedent rather than a legal
one. 147
To the east of the state lands at Prudhoe Bay is ANWR. 14' The
creation of ANWR began in 1957 when an application was filed to
141. Id.at 243.
142.

M. LYNNE CORN, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: BACKGROUND AND

ISSUES 111, Cong. Research Serv., Libr. of Cong., RL31278 (Mar. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
ANWR BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 2003].
143. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 10, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48
U.S.C. Ch,2, Refs & Annos (2003).
144. Id.
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6508 (2003). The legislation also requires Alaska to prioritize the
use of revenues from NPR-A for the communities most severely or directly impacted by the
development. Id.
146. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2003), cited in 1987 Alaska Op. 121, supra note 19.
147. For example, in speaking before the Congressional Committee on Resources to
discuss H.R. 2436, the proposed "Energy Security Act," Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton
stated:
We recognize the historical antecedents of the 90%-10% distribution. However, the
legislation of two decades ago authorizing the oil and gas leasing program in the
National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska provides for a 50%-50% split of lease revenues
between the State and the Federal government. We believe the 50%-50% division of
revenues should also apply to leasing in ANWR.
Gale Norton, Statement of Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, Before the Committee on
Resources, U.S. House of Representatives on H.R. 2436, "The Energy Security Act" (July 11,
2001), available in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony.
148. ANWR LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2002, supra note 7, at 1.
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create an Arctic Wildlife Range.149 The creation of the Range
excluded these lands from Alaska's statehood grant."' The Arctic
National Wildlife Range was formally created in December 1960.51
In 1980, as part of the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act ("ANILCA"), the refuge was renamed the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge.1 2 ANILCA also made much of the refuge
a wilderness area, except for the 1.5 million acre coastal plain, and
therefore off-limits to oil drilling. 5 3 In 1981, the coastal plain of
ANWR was temporarily withdrawn from mineral leasing to review its
oil and gas potential. 54 In 1987, the Interior Department completed
its review, as required by ANILCA, and Secretary of the Interior
Hodel recommended that the coastal plain of ANWR be opened to oil
and gas leasing. 5 Two events made this recommendation almost
impossible to happen at that time: First, oil prices in the 1980s fell to
historic lows; second, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 steeled
environmental opposition to any development in ANWR.5l 6 The
closest that ANWR has come to drilling operations was in 1996, when
President Clinton vetoed the Balanced Budget Act, which would have
Plain of the Refuge and would have
allowed for drilling in the Coastal
157
fifty-fifty.
revenues
split the
IV. ALASKA V. UNITED STATES: ALASKA SUES THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR NOT LIVING UP TO THE
TERMS OF THE STATEHOOD ACT

The idea of drilling in ANWR, but under a different revenuesharing formula than as for other public lands in Alaska, has been
around since at least the mid-1980s.158 In order to acquire the support
of members of Congress that might not otherwise support
development, the Alaska congressional delegation has supported a
fifty-fifty revenue sharing plan for development in ANWR.5 9
Opposed to such a measure based on its "statehood compact"
149. Id. at 2.
150.

BALDWIN, supra note 14, at 2.

151. ANWR LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2002, supra note 7, at 2.
152. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 302, 94 Stat.
2371 (1980).
153. Id. § 1002.
154. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 685, 696 (1996).
155. Id. at 697.
156. ANWR BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 2003, supra note 142, at 21.
157. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. §§ 5312-5344 (1996).
158. 1986 Alaska Op. 363, supra note 19.
159. Liz Ruskin, ANWR Drilling Moves to Senate, Faces Tough Battle, SCRIPPS-HOWARD
NEWS SERV., Aug. 2, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, All News File.

2004]

The Alaska StatehoodAct

1019

argument, the State of Alaska has been to court to protect its ninety
percent share.160
A. Alaska's Claims in Alaska v. United States
The discussion of whether Alaska's Statehood Act is a compact,
and what the parties may have intended in including section 28(b) in
the Act, had few actual consequences until 1991. At that time,
Congress directed the Interior Department to first deduct
administrative costs from royalties received under the MLA before it
distributed the proceeds to the states.'
In 1993, Congress amended
the MLA to reflect this change in policy.' 62 Prior to this time, the
administrative expenses had been paid out of the federal government's
share, so that the states received a gross percentage.' 63 The effect of
Congress's decision
was to reduce the states' share of royalties to a net
64
percentage.1
By making a claim based on the incorporation of the MLA into
the Alaska Statehood Act, Alaska was in a unique position among the
states to challenge Congress' authority to change the MLA165 In
1993, the State of Alaska brought an action against the federal
government in the United States Court of Federal Claims, charging
that, under its Statehood Act, Alaska was entitled to ninety percent of
the gross revenues from mineral development on public lands.'6 6
At the same time, Alaska had been suffering from low oil prices
for several years and had become increasingly dissatisfied with the
slow pace with which federal lands were being opened to development.
In particular, the state was frustrated with Congress's failure to open
ANWR to development.' 67 As a result, in Alaska v. United States, the
state added four other claims to its MLA claim, which were based in
part on the failure of Congress to act on the Department of Interior's
1987 recommendation that the coastal plain of ANWR should be
168
opened for exploration.
First, Alaska claimed that the United States had breached the
Statehood Act "by its pattern of withdrawing federally owned lands in
Alaska from mineral leasing and by its diminution of Alaska's [ninety
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166
167.
168.

See generally 1981 Alaska Op., supra note 19.
Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 697-98.
Pub. L. No. 103-66, §10201, 107 Stat. 407 (1993).
Alaska, 35 Fed. CI. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 697, 705.
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percent] share of mineral leasing revenues."' 69 Second, Alaska claimed
that the people of Alaska had relied on the federal government's
promise to develop federal mineral lands in Alaska and that its failure
to do so was a breach of contract. 7 ° Third, Alaska claimed that
Congress breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
Fourth, Alaska claimed
failing to develop mineral lands in Alaska.'
that Congress' failure to develop mineral lands in Alaska constituted a
taking of the revenues that Alaska would have received from that
development.17 2
In summary, Alaska argued that the federal government had
granted Alaska ninety percent of the mineral leasing revenues from
public lands and that this was to be an unalterable financial
foundation of the new state.173 It argued that the grant was ninety
percent of the gross revenues at the time of statehood, and so it should
remain.'74 It also argued that the federal government had an implied
duty to permit a reasonable amount of leasing to effect the purpose of
The State of Alaska claimed
the grant of leasing revenue. 75
$2,330,456.15 in improperly deducted administrative expenses under
the MLA claim,' 76 and $29 billion in contract damages under the other
claims.'7 7
B. The Court of Claims Assumed, Without Deciding, that Section 28(b)
of the Alaska StatehoodAct Was Binding on Both Parties
The Court of Claims first thoroughly reviewed the history of the
Statehood Act as it relates to this issue, and then turned to some of the
U.S. Supreme Court cases that have analyzed other statehood acts, to
see if such acts are truly binding and unalterable. 7 ' The Court of
Claims determined that statehood acts have been found to have "the
character of contracts in some respects, and in other respects, the
Without going into a detailed
character of normal legislation." '
analysis, the court cited examples of cases where the Supreme Court
treated certain provisions as binding, such as Andrus v. Utah where the
169. Id. at 687.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.at 698.
175. Id. at687n.1.
176. Id. at 697-98.
177. Brief for Appellee 10-11, Alaska v. United States, 119 F.3d 16 (Table, Text in
Westlaw), Unpublished Disposition, 1997 WL 33512967 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (96-5124).
178. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 698.
179. Id.
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Court said that Utah's land grant was a "'solemn agreement' which in
some ways may be analogized to a contract between private parties."18
In contrast, the Court of Claims also cited to a Ninth Circuit case
where that court said that section (6)(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act,
which gave control of fish and wildlife to the State of Alaska, is
subordinate to the federal government's management of fish and
wildlife on federal lands. 8'
In a footnote, the Court of Claims also pointed out that some
sections of the Statehood Act were clearly intended to be alterable,
such as section 12(b) which provided for the locations of federal courts
(which has changed since statehood) and which also provided that
Alaska shall be one judicial district (which Congress could presumably
change as necessary). 82 In its appeal of Alaska v. United States,
however, Alaska distinguished those provisions that can be altered
without its express approval when it is to the State's benefit, while
retaining the right to challenge changes that are made to its
detriment.'8 3
The Court of Claims declined to rule on whether the entire
statehood act is a contract, saying it was unnecessary to do so because
statehood acts can have "particular provisions that are binding and
unalterable" as against Congress, without the entire act being so.'84 It
said that it was enough to determine if section 28(b) was a binding
contractual provision in the way that Alaska claimed.'
To this end, the court briefly reiterated both side's positions.
The federal government's position was that section 28(b) was merely a
technical amendment, intended to make a clean transition for Alaska
to continue to receive MLA funds in the same way that it had as a
territory, and that section 28(b) was not intended to permanently bind
the federal government. 86 Alaska charged that section 28(b) was a
contractual provision that was an essential monetary function of the
new state and was relied upon by Alaskans when they approved the
Statehood Act.'87
The federal government countered that section 28(b) could not
have been an incentive for Alaskans to choose statehood because the
Territory of Alaska was already receiving ninety percent of the MLA
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 698 (citing Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980)).
Id. (citing Alaska v. Andrus, 429 F. Supp. 958 (D. Alaska 1977)).
Id. at 698 n.25.
Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 8; see also 1981 Alaska Op., supra note 19.
Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
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funds when the Statehood Act was created, and pointed to statements
by congressional representatives that indicated that the inclusion of
section 28(b) was a mere technical amendment.18 8 Alaska returned
with congressional history that indicated it was to be part of the
financial base upon which the new state was built.189 Alaska also cited
to the speeches made by Secretary of the Interior Seaton 9 ° as evidence
that Alaskans relied on promises of the federal government in
accepting statehood. 191
The court rejected both parties' positions as flawed. 19 2 It said
that Alaska had overstated its position, that the revenue sharing
provision "was not viewed as the key component of financial viability
for the State." ' But it also said that it could not accept the federal
government's position that section 28(b) was not a substantive part of
the compact, because section 28(b) "was plainly viewed as one
'
component in an effort to ensure that Alaska was financially viable."194
The court settled on a middle ground:
Ultimately, the subject matter of the Statehood Act-entry
into a union of states-is sui generis and cannot be strictly
compressed into a contractual or legislative mold. It is
neither a garden-variety contract nor routine legislation. The
statehood debate cannot be analogized to the normal
negotiations between parties to commercial contracts. The
Act was not negotiated in the same way as a normal contract.
There were not two distinct parties. The plebiscite on
statehood and the debate on the pros and cons of statehood
concerned what was fundamentally a political issue.1 9
The court ended its discussion of the contractual implications of
the Statehood Act by saying that it was unnecessary for it to determine
whether section 28(b) was contractually binding or "mere
legislation."' 96 The court said that it was prepared to assume Alaska's
view that section 28(b) was a contractually enforceable provision of the
Statehood Act.197 The court then asked, if it was an enforceable
provision, did section 28(b) contain a promise by the federal

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 699-700.
See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
Alaska, 35 Fed. C1. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Alaska, 35 Fed. C1. at 701.
Id.
Id.
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government to pay a gross percentage of revenues, in perpetuity, as
Alaska asserted? 198
C. Section 28(b) Was Held Not to Containa Promise to Pay Alaska
Ninety Percent of the Gross Revenues Under the MLA
The Court of Claims then weighed the arguments as to whether
Alaska was entitled to a gross share of revenues under section 28(b).' 99
As support for its position, Alaska pointed out that in contrast to
section 28(b), which is silent on the issue of gross or net, section 28(a)
of the Act gave Alaska ninety percent of "[a]ll net profits from
operation of government coal mines ...."200 The court agreed with
Alaska, citing to the U.S. Supreme Court case Russello v. United
States, in which the Court said, "Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. 20 ' Although
the Court of Claims does not specifically say so, it seemed to accept
Alaska's argument that a gross calculation was originally intended,
because it next changed directions and asked if Alaska, unique among
in perpetuity on "the particular
the states, had the right to insist
22
legislative scheme then extant? 1
"Plainly it is possible for Congress to makes such a promise...
the Court of Claims said, referring to the claim that Congress bound
itself to the terms of the MLA as they were in 1958 (at least as it
relates to Alaska). 2 3 But it stressed that such "a promise not to alter
legislation is not one that should be lightly inferred into a contract
[with the federal government] ."204 The court then declared that what
section 28(b) accomplished was to plug Alaska into a pre-existing
legislative scheme that gave it ninety percent of the gross proceeds "at
that time." 2 ' But Congress, according to the court, made no promises
as to the future:
While it is true that the inclusion of revenue sharing provisions
was an important part of the mix of provisions necessary to
address concerns about how the new state would be financed, it
198. Id.
199. Id. at 702-03.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Russello, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
202. Id. at 703.
203. Id. (citing Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
cert. granted, 516 U.S. 1087 (1996)).
204. Id. (citing Trapper Mining Inc. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1991)).
205. Id.
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is also inescapable that there were no expectations or intent that
Alaska's position would
be privileged as against other States, at
20 6
least in this respect.
In short, the court held that there was "no promise on the part of
the federal government to pay Alaska, in perpetuity, 90 percent of the
gross mineral leasing revenues from federal mineral leases in
Alaska." 2 07
The court threw out that claim, as well as the rest of Alaska's
claims, on summary judgment for the United States. 2 8 The Court of
Appeals upheld the decision,20 9 and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 210 In 2000, Congress changed the MLA distribution back
to a gross calculation in favor of the states2
V. ALASKA'S CLAIMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE TEXT OF THE
ALASKA STATEHOOD ACT, ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, OR
CASE LAW ANALYZING STATEHOOD ACTS

The Court of Claims limited its holding in Alaska v. United
States to the narrowest possible terms. In doing so, it left many
questions unanswered. In particular, the court avoided answering the
question raised in section II.C of this Comment: are MLA proceeds
under section 28(b) a part of Alaska's statehood compact? The answer
to this question can be found in the text of the Act, and is supported
by the legislative history of the Act and judicial precedent: The federal
government made promises to Alaska in the Statehood Act, but an
unalterable right to any percentage of revenues from mineral leases on
public land was not one of them.
A. The Text of the Alaska Statehood Act Does Not Support a Claim
That Section 28(b) Is Part of Alaska's Statehood Grant
Alaska has repeatedly claimed that the Alaska Statehood Act is a
"compact," and has commonly referred to it as "the Statehood
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 706.
209. Alaska v. United States, 119 F.3d 16 (Table, Text in WESTLAW), Unpublished
Disposition 1997 WL 382032 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("(Alffirmed on the basis of the reasoning set
forth in the lengthy, detailed, precise and correct opinion of Judge Bruggink. Judge Bruggink's
scholarly opinion is thoroughly supported with cited and quoted authority and record evidence.
Nothing more need be said.").
210. State of Alaska v. United States, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998).
211. Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-393 § 503, 114 Stat. 1607 (amending 30 U.S.C. § 191(b) (2000)) (current version at 30

U.S.C. § 191(b) (2003)).
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Compact," as if the Act is synonymous with "compact." 2 12 However,
if there is any authority for the proposition that an entire statehood act
is necessarily a compact, Alaska has not brought if forth. Analysis of
the text of the Alaska Statehood Act does not support a claim that the
entire document is a "compact," binding on both the State of Alaska
and the federal government. Analysis of the text further shows that
section 28(b) is not a part of a compact. While one section uses the
word "compact," and certain sections have language that binds both
the federal government and Alaska, section 28(b) is not among them.
Section 1 of the Act recites a brief declaration admitting Alaska
into the Union.21 1 Sections 2 and 3, respectively, set the boundaries of
the State as those of the Territory, and require Alaska to always have a
constitution that is republican in form.214
Section 4 is the only section in the Act that uses the word
"compact." It states:
[A]s a compact with the United States said State and its people
do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title
to any lands or other property not granted or confirmed to the
State or its political subdivisions by or under the authority of
this Act .... 215

Although it is phrased in the negative, by its plain language, this
section creates a "compact" between Alaska and the United States
concerning Alaska's right to those "lands or other property...
granted or confirmed" to Alaska under the Act. The scope of the
compact is limited to "lands or other property ...

granted or

confirmed" and does not implicate the entire Act.216
It is clear what the word "lands" means, but the term "other
property" in section 4 is ambiguous. The Act does not provide a
definition of "other property," but later in section 4, it clarifies that

212. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
213. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 1, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48
U.S.C.A. Ch.2, Refs & Annos (2003).
214. Id. §§ 2-3.
215. Id.§4.
216. Compare this language with the language in section 4 of Hawaii's statehood act, which
was passed the next year and follows a similar form:
As a compact with the United States relating to the management and disposition of
the Hawaiian home lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended,
shall be adopted as a provision of the Constitution of said State, as provided in section
7, subsection (b) of this Act, subject to amendment or repeal only with the consent of
the United States, and in no other manner.
Hawaii Statehood Act, Pub. L. 86-3, § 4, 73 Stat. 4 (1959), reprinted in 48 U.S.C.A. Ch. 3, Refs
& Annos (2003).
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"other property," as it relates to land held in trust for Native
Alaskans, includes fishing rights.2 1'
The definition of "other property" is important to Alaska's
argument for two reasons: First, a right to ninety percent of the
revenue under the MLA could certainly be considered "other
property," as much as fishing rights are. Therefore, it is possible that
section 28(b) is implicated by the reference to "other property" in
section 4 of the Statehood Act. Second, one of the questions that was
placed before Alaskans when they were asked to approve statehood,
under section 8, was whether to consent to "[a]ll provisions of the
Act ... prescribing the terms or conditions of the grants of land or
other property ... ,,218 Alaskans went to the polls and accepted the
terms of the "compact" by agreeing to the promise of "lands or other
property." What remains is to determine what section 4 means by
"other property," and whether it includes proceeds under the MLA
from section 28(b).
The discussion of property in the Act continues in section 5,
which states:
The State of Alaska and its political subdivisions respectively,
shall have and retain title to all property, real and personal, title
to which is in the Territory of Alaska or any of the subdivisions.
Except as provided in section 6 hereof, the United States shall
retain title to all property, real and personal, to which it has title,
including public lands.219
"Title" is a concept so nebulous, and ambiguous that its exact
meaning in this context would be very difficult to define. And the
federal government could have granted mineral rights to the public
lands in Alaska, under the MLA, without having given up title to
those lands. However, the placement of this section suggests that the
drafters meant to limit the property that was being given up by the
federal government to that which it granted in section 6.
Section 6 lists out the "lands" that are referred to in section 4, as
well as "other property. '' 220 It starts by making two 400,000-acre land
The "other property"
grants and the 102,550,000-acre grant.
transferred to Alaska in this section included several blocks of land in
Juneau, the state capital, and real and personal property used in fish
It also included seventy percent of the
and wildlife protection.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Alaska Statehood Act § 4.
Id. §8.
ld. § 5.
Id. § 6.
Id.
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revenue from the seal and sea otter skins trade, and five percent of the
222
proceeds of sales of public lands for the support of public schools.
Most important among the "other property" to go to Alaska,
subsection 6(i) specifically granted Alaska the rights to mineral
deposits on those lands it chose.223
While the term "other property" is not explicitly defined in the
Act, the property in section 6, including mineral rights to lands
granted, is clearly implicated by the references to "other property" in
section 4 and section 8. Arguably, though, if the mineral rights to
land granted to Alaska under section 6 are "other property," then
revenue from federal lands under the MLA in section 28(b) can be
"other property" as well.
Although the Act does not expressly limit "other property" to
mean that property exclusively listed in section 6, the operative
language used in that section to grant property is not used in other
parts of the Act, including section 28. In describing land and other
property to be given to Alaska under section 6, the Act uses very
concrete granting language that reflects the language of section 4 and
section 8. In reference to the public lands granted to Alaska in section
6(a), the Act uses the specific word "granted," stating, "the State of
Alaska is hereby granted and shall be entitled to select ....
"224
The
mineral rights to those lands under section 6(i) are also referred to as
"grants."
Additionally, the language used to describe the other property
listed in section 6 also follows the same pattern of explicit transfer.
The blocks of land in Juneau were "granted." 22" The property used in
fish and wildlife management was "transferred and conveyed. ' 226 For
the revenue from fur seals and from the sale of public land, the
operative phrases are "shall be paid to said State ' 227 and "shall pay to
the State of Alaska, ' 22' respectively. In short, the grants of "lands or
other property" in section 6 are unequivocal and use concrete language
that reflects the clear intent of both Congress and Alaskans.
In contrast to the granting language used in sections 4, 6, and 8,
section 28(b) has no such language. The operative phrase in section
28(b) is that the MLA is "hereby amended. 22 1 Similar language is
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.

229.

Id. § 28(b).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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used in other sections of the Act that amended existing legislation so
The legislation that was amended
as to incorporate Alaska. 23"
included numerous changes to Titles 18 and 28 of the United States
Code; changes to the Federal Reserve Act; the Immigration and
Nationality Act; the Merchant Marine Act; as well as the MLA.2 31 In
all of these instances, the Statehood Act had a transitional or
housekeeping function that assured the new State of Alaska was
subject to existing legislation that had applied to the Territory. The
Act uses similar non-granting language throughout to achieve this
end.
If Congress intended to make a grant of the mineral revenues
from public lands, or if Alaskans expected to be granted such a right
under section 28(b), it is remarkable that section 28(b) does not
expressly state such a grant--especially when the drafters were so
explicit about the grants in section 6. It is also telling that such an
arguably important provision, unprecedented in the history of the
United States, would be found among the administrative and
housekeeping provisions at the end of the Act, instead of prominently
featured within section 6, alongside the other rights in property that
the Act granted.
In short, the text of the Act supports the idea that there was a
"compact" between the United States and the State of Alaska and that
the compact is contained within the Alaska Statehood Act. This
compact was an agreement that promised Alaska "lands and other
property." It appears from a plain language reading that Alaskans'
rights to "lands or other property" under the compact are limited to
those in section 6.
The purpose of section 28(b) was to amend existing legislation to
incorporate the new State of Alaska into that legislation, and not a
binding provision in the same way that the grant of lands and other
property in section 6 was. It did not provide Alaska with any more
rights as a state than it had as a territory.
B. The Legislative History of the Statehood Act Does Not Support the
Claim That Section 28(b) Is Part of Alaska's Compact
Although the text of the Alaska Statehood Act does not support
the claim that section 28(b) of the Act is part of the "statehood
compact," Alaska has claimed that there are statements in the
legislative history which show that Congress intended to permanently
grant Alaska ninety percent of the mineral revenues from public lands.
230. See, e.g., id. §§ 12, 22-27.
231. Id. §§ 12, 19, 22, 27-28.
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How can these two seemingly contrary positions be reconciled? The
answer is that some of those statements do not support Alaska's
position as strongly as Alaska has argued.
One problem with citing congressional statements that seem to
support certain interpretations of the Statehood Act is that there were
many statehood bills over the years, and some remarks refer to earlier
bills that never became law. For example, an Alaska State Attorney
General Opinion 232 cites to Senator Barrett of Wyoming, who
authored section 28(b), as support for the inviolate nature of that
section. Senator Barrett said:
So I think it would be eminently fair and just and right and
proper, when we write this bill up, that we ...

let the Federal

Government retain the title to the minerals except such public
lands as are granted to you, but give the Territory now and the
State of Alaska-to-be [ninety percent] of the income from the
minerals
under the Leasing Act royalties that come in from now
2 33
on

out.

Reliance on this citation is misplaced, however, because it refers
to a statehood bill that was before a Senate hearing in 1957, but which
did not pass into law.234 After that statehood bill failed to pass in
1957, Congress amended the MLA to grant the territory of Alaska the
ninety percent distribution via ordinary legislation. 23 Even assuming
that Senator Barrett's comments can be construed to mean that Alaska
was to be granted the ninety percent provision in perpetuity under
that version of the Act, it does not follow that the same intent attached
to the Statehood Act that passed a year later.
Some statements in the legislative history that refer to the bills
that became the Statehood Act are ambiguous as to whether they
actually support Alaska's position. For example, Senator Butler of
Maryland said, "My research has also developed that there is
contained in the bill provisions which have the effect of giving away
more revenue and more property than has ever been given to any State
in its enabling act. "236 Alaska has argued that the "revenue" to which
he refers is that from section 28(b). 237 However, Senator Butler could
just as well have been talking about the revenue provisions in section
232. See generally 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19.
233. 1988 Alaska Op. 327, supra note 19, at 5 (citing Hearings on S. 49 and S. 35 Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1957)) (emphasis
added).
234. See supra section III.C.
235. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 693 (1996).
236. 85 CONG. REc. 12,316-17 (1958).
237. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 11-12.
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6, including the revenue from seals and the sale of public lands and
from the mineral rights that Alaska was granted. Section 28(b) is not
necessarily implicated by his statement.
One reason that references in the legislative history to "revenue"
or "other property" are ambiguous, is because Alaska's land grant was
considerably more generous than any state's that had preceded it.238
First, the size of the grant was larger than any other state had received,
as this was to be the foundation upon which Alaska would become a
state. 239 Just the amount of state-owned land in Alaska would make it
the second largest state.24 ° Second, Alaska had the unprecedented
right to choose whatever unreserved lands it wanted, while previous
statehood grants had been limited to particular sections within
townships. 241' Third, Alaska also had the right to select mineral lands
and keep all the revenues from those mineral lands, which was not
typically the case with land grants.242 Finally, Alaska was allowed to
dispose of the land it chose without the revenues being dedicated to
any specific purpose.2 43 Other statehood grants typically required a
new state to use its selected lands for support of education.244 Seen in
this light, the sentiments of Senator Butler and others take on new
meanings. The "revenue" to which he refers to does not have to
include revenue under the MLA in section 28(b), because an
unprecedented amount of revenue was given to Alaska under section
6.
One statement from a central figure in Alaska's statehood
process unambiguously supports Alaska's position. Senator Ernest
Gruening asserted that ninety percent of the mineral lease revenues
from federal land were "part of our Statehood Act. 21 4 The problem
with Senator Gruening's statement is that courts disfavor after-thefact statements of congressional representatives as being valuable
legislative history. 246 Although there is no reason to impugn Senator
Gruening's view on the subject, especially written almost two decades
238. Brief for Appellee, supra note 177, at 5; see also NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at
157.
239. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 690.
240. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
241. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1980), cited in Brief for Appellee, supra note
177, at 5.
242. Andrus, 446 U.S. at 508-09.
243. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in 48
U.S.C.A. Ch.2, Refs & Annos (2003).
244. 35 Fed. Cl. at 690; see also Brief for Appellee, supra note 177, at 5; NASKE supra note
48, at 49, 96.
245. GRUENING, supra note 46, at 95.
246. GWENDOLYN B. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 30-41 (1972).
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before it appears to have become an important issue, there is still a
presumption that time and personal interests cloud recollection.
Therefore, courts will weigh such evidence, if at all, much less than
evidence that was contemporaneous with the Act.247
In summary, there is evidence in the legislative record that shows
that Alaska's statehood package entitles it to ninety percent of the
mineral revenues from public lands, but that evidence is not strong
enough to overcome the presumptions in favor of the federal
government. This is the lesson of Alaska v. United States, in which
Alaska's best arguments came up lacking.
C. Case Law Analyzing Other StatehoodActs Does Not
Support Alaska's Position
Although Alaska v. United States did not shut the door on the
courts upholding Alaska's claimed right to revenues from public land
under section 28(b), the court's reasoning shows that Alaska was not
2 48
promised ninety percent of the MLA revenues in perpetuity.
Moreover, the remaining judicial support for Alaska's position is thin.
The courts have not provided a "strict taxonomy" to guide to a
ready solution of disputes involving statehood acts. 2 49 As the Court of
Claims said in Alaska v. United States, compacts have been "construed
to partake of the character of contracts in some respects, and in other
respects the character of normal legislation. ' 211 On first inspection,
the language of some prominent U.S. Supreme Court cases seems to
support Alaska's claim that the Statehood Act is a binding compact.
Upon closer examination, however, much of the Court's discussion of
statehood compacts as inviolate refers only to the land grants as
compacts and not to the acts as a whole as compacts.
For example, in Beecher v. Wetherby, with regard to Wisconsin's
statehood, the Court said, "It was, therefore, an unalterable condition
of the admission, obligatory upon the United States, that section
sixteen (16) in every township of the public lands in the State, which
had not been sold or otherwise disposed of, should be granted to the
State for the use of schools. 2' The "unalterable condition" the Court
discusses is the discrete issue of the land grants. 252 Similarly, in
Cooper v. Roberts, with regard to Michigan's statehood, when the
247. Id.
248.

BALDWIN, supra note 14, at 31; ANWR LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2002, supra note 7, at

9; ANWR CONTROVERSIES 2003, supra note 8, at 11.
249. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 698 (1996).
250. Id. at 698.
251. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 523 (1877).
252. Id.
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Court talked about "terms of compact" as being "unalterable except
by consent," it was also the land grants that were the issue. 2 3 And in
Andrus v. Utah, the Court describes land grants for the support of
schools as a "'solemn agreement' which in some ways may be
analogized to a contract between private parties., 2 4 While the courts
have elevated these specific land grants within statehood acts to a
higher status, there is no reason to extend these references to
necessarily encompass all statehood acts in their entirety.
There is additional case law that indicates that section 28(b) is
not a part of a binding compact between Alaska and the United States.
In Watt v. Alaska, the Court upheld a lower court's interpretation of a
conflict between the MLA and the Wildlife Refuge Sharing Act
("WRSA"), as it applied to oil leases in wildlife refuges. 25 Had the
WRSA controlled, rather than the MLA, the State of Alaska would
have received none of the proceeds from drilling in the Kenai National
Moose Range in South-Central Alaska.25 6 In dicta, arguing that the
case never should have been before the Court in the first place, Justice
Stevens said:
The question of how to divide the revenues from oil and gas
leases on public lands in the Kenai Peninsula is clearly a matter
for Congress to decide. If Congress is displeased with the
decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, it may
promptly reverse them by revising the relevant statutes.257
This statement has been cited to show that Congress has the
power to unilaterally determine how the proceeds from ANWR
should be divided. 2 8 However, it is important to note that this case
was about the interpretation of two conflicting statutes; a statehood
compact argument was not before the Court.25 9 But if such an
argument occurred to Justice Stevens, he did not give it any weight.
In summary, there are cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has
held statehood compacts to a higher level than ordinary legislation,
but those cases are limited in scope. They do not stand for the
proposition that an entire statehood act is necessarily a compact.
Although the case law does not by any means exclude the possibility
that section 28(b) was part of Alaska's "compact," neither can it be
253. Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. 173, 178 (1855).
254.
255.

Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980).
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981).

256. Id. at 272.
257. Id.at 274.
258. Brief of the United States in Opposition at 13-14, Alaska v. United States, 118 S.Ct.
1035, 1998 WL 34102975 (1998) (No. 97-750).
259. 1986 Alaska Op. 363, supra note 19, at 4.
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used to show that any section of the Act was necessarily a part of
Alaska's compact merely by virtue of having been included in the Act.
D. Revenue SharingIs a PoliticalDecision
The reason that most Alaskans support drilling for oil in ANWR
is simple economics. As predicted before statehood, the cost of
providing state services in Alaska is high-twice as high as the next
most costly state, Hawaii, and more than five times the national
average.26 This is due to the large geographic area served and the fact
that Alaska has a small, dispersed population, thus making it difficult
to distribute the fixed costs of government services over a broad tax
base.261 Most troubling for Alaskans, the production of oil in Alaska
has been in decline since 1987.262 Since Alaska receives eighty percent
of its tax revenue from oil, the state's economic base is shrinking, with
potentially serious consequences to the social fabric of the state.
Moreover, declining oil production on the North Slope means
that Alaska will eventually not be able to produce enough oil to keep
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline functioning.263 For this reason alone, a
compromise to accept half of the royalty revenues from ANWR might
seem very desirable if oil from ANWR can help to extend the life of
the of the oilfields on state land around Prudhoe Bay, from which
Alaska gets all the lease and royalty revenue.
Although the electorate in Alaska does not have much say in
whether ANWR is opened to development, to a certain extent they
control their own destiny concerning revenue sharing. In 1996, in
reaction to the decision in Alaska v. United States, voters amended the
Alaska Constitution. The Alaska Constitution now requires a twothirds approval of both houses of the Alaska legislature, or a majority
vote of the people, for Alaska to support a federal statute if it affects
an interest of Alaska under the Statehood Act.2 64 Presumably, this
260. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 290 tbl. 447.
261. NASKE, supranote 48, at 273-74.
262. ANWR BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 2003, supra note 142, at21.
263. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 697 (1996).
264. ALASKA CONST. art. 12, § 14, which states:
[A] federal statute or proposed federal statute that affects an interest of this State
under the Act admitting Alaska to the Union is ineffective as against the State interest
unless approved by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature or approved by
the people of the State. The legislature may, by a resolution passed by a majority vote
of each house, place the question of approval of the federal statute on the ballot for the
next general election unless in the resolution placing the question of approval, the
legislature requires the question to be placed before the voters at a special election.
The approval of the federal statute by the people of the State is not effective unless the
federal statute described in the resolution is ratified by a majority of the qualified
voters of the State who vote on the question. Unless a summary of the question is
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means that Alaska would not be able to participate in development in
ANWR under a fifty-fifty split without one of the prescribed methods
Moreover, without Alaska's
of agreement by Alaskans.265
acquiescence, development would be very difficult.
On the other hand, the amendment gives the Alaska Legislature
the authority to make such a decision as well. Arguably, it did not
have such authority without the amendment because it was the people
of Alaska who accepted the terms of the Alaska Statehood Act and not
the Legislature.266 Perhaps in adopting this amendment to their
constitution Alaskans gave away a right that many believe they were
granted at statehood.
VI. CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that Congress has the authority to
permanently bind itself to the terms of a "statehood compact."
However, the text of the Alaska Statehood Act does not support the
idea that Alaska's statehood compact includes ninety percent of the
revenues from mineral leases and royalties on federal lands. Even if
another reading of the Act reaches the opposite conclusion, the Court
of Claims decision in Alaska v. United States strongly suggests that
section 28(b) of the Statehood Act does not contain a promise by the
federal government to pay Alaska, in perpetuity, ninety percent of the
revenues under the MLA.
How does one reconcile the two notions that (1) Congress
purposefully incorporated the MLA into the Statehood Act, but (2)
did not make the MLA part of the compact contained within the Act?
The answer is that Congress did intend for ninety percent of the
revenues from mineral leases to be part of the financial foundation of
Alaska, but that Congress did not intend to grant this right in
perpetuity. Congress did not give up its right to later change the
distribution formula in the MLA as it sees fit.
And if the late Senator Gruening and other statehood activists
are correct-that the federal government did promise that Alaska
would always get ninety percent of the revenues from mineral
development on federal lands-then they made a critical mistake: they
did not get it in writing.
provided in the resolution passed by the legislature, the lieutenant governor shall
prepare an impartial summary of the question. The lieutenant governor shall present
the question to the voters so that a "yes" vote on the question is a vote to approve the
federal statute.
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